For a revolutionary socialist workers party Aug/Sept 1989
This issue - Ireland 1969-89, Ireland and the SWP, RDG
IRELAND 1969-1989 OUR TASKS
The twentieth anniversary of the re-deployment of British troops in Ireland in August 1969 is of fundamental importance to socialists in 1989 because the revolutionary struggle that was unleashed. The upsurge in international working class struggle in 1968 found its highest expression in the UK, not in the spontaneous strikes and anti Vietnam war demos, but in the mass revolt in the working class ghettos of the six counties. It was in Belfast and Derry that the underlying economic grievances of mass unemployment, job discrimination and housing were translated by the movement into a political struggle.
Reform and revolution
One of the major lessons from the twenty years of struggle in the six counties is the danger of crude ultra-left counterpoising of "reform or revolution". Whilst reform may be the opposite of revolution, the struggle for immediate reforms may lead to revolutionary situation. The Civil Rights Movement was essentially a reformist movement for decent housing and equality in employment. In the face of the sectarian state with its 28,000 strong paramilitary security forces they raised demands that went right to the heart of the unionist constitution. A movement for reform needed revolutionary action to achieve its ends. The scale of the struggle of the anti-Unionist masses has not been matched in recent times anywhere in the UK. The people armed themselves established control of their own areas, resisted pogroms and fought the UK Orange state to a standstill. They established forms of dual power. Yet many socialists initially failed to see the revolutionary potential, because they did not understand the connection between demands for reform and the democratic revolution.
Ireland and Democratic Revolution in the UK
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is not simply a capitalist state, or even a Parliamentary democracy, it is a Constitutional Monarchy. This rotten and corrupt system of Government denies all right of self-determination to the Irish, Scottish and Welsh peoples.
The constitution, with its parasitic institutions such as the House of Lords, Judiciary, Whitehall bureaucracy and the Monarchy is undemocratic. The two party system, Her Majesty’s Government and Loyal Opposition, is a travesty of democracy. It virtually guarentees a monopoly of the two main bourgeois parties, Tories and Labour. Through Her Majesty’s Labour Party, the trade union bureaucracy ties the working class into the political order.
Crisis of democracy
The crisis of UK capitalism is not merely economic but political. There exists a deep crisis of democracy. Nowhere can this been seen more clearly than in the repressive measures to hold the six counties in the Union. The last two decades of the Irish struggle has clearly shown that the socialist movement in the UK is a prisoner of the Constitution and blind to this fact. Under this political system, the class struggle, in so far as it becomes revolutionary and democratic must inevitably take a Republican direction.
Republicanism
Republicanism is not socialism but is part of the political struggle towards it. As James Connoly replied in his day: "Those who never got beyond the ABC of the question, will remind me that even in a republic the worker is exploited, as for instance in France and the United States, they argue we cannot be Republicans. To this I reply the countries mentioned have only capitalism to deal with we have capitalism and a Monarchy". Republicanism might be "merely" a reform, but one with revolutionary implications. In this context a successful conclusion of the historic struggle of the Irish people for independence must be seen not only as part of the Irish revolution but as part of the tasks of the Democratic Revolution in the UK as a whole.
The repression of democracy
The UK ruling class has responded to the revolt in the six counties with a clear understanding of the revolutionary implications of republicanism. An understanding which the workers movement lacks. The whole stability of the constitutional political system in the UK is under threat.
Therefore to hold the six counties the UK ruling class has erected a scaffolding around the sectarian state, removing any pretence of democracy. The Hillsborough Agreement is the latest repressive reinforcement with an array of laws to back up the Army, RUC UDR and loyalist death squads.
Their aim is to isolate the struggle from "normal politics". It has carried out a massive campaign of lies and disinformation with the Kinnockite liberals and Thatcherite hardliners maintaining the same policy in one form or another. This propaganda has fertile ground because of the chauvinist ideas dominant in the working class and maintained by the trade union bureaucracy. In the 26 Counties southern state, the Irish ruling class with its own fears of revolution which mirror the anti-Democratic measures of their UK counterparts and reinforces partition.
Breaking the stalemate
The partition of Ireland is a bolster against real democratic change in Ireland and the UK as a whole. In the twenty years the movement in the six counties has raised the Unionist Stormount to the ground, and cracked the Unionist monolith. The strength of the movement can be seen in the inability of the UK government to reimpose stable rule. But at present there is a stalemate. This means an impasse for the struggle for democracy in the UK and Ireland as a whole.
This impasse is a result of the failure of revolutionary marxists to generalise the republican struggle not only to the working class in Southern Ireland, but also to the English, Scottish, and Welsh workers. This does not simply mean that the English, Scottish and Welsh working class should support demands for British withdrawal and build solidarity with the Irish liberation movement, BUT that these workers should put forward their own republican demands. This is one of the reasons why we advocate a Federal Republic of England, Scotland and Wales and a United Ireland.
Three tasks
The working class of England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales that is the key to turning the Irish war into a democratic revolution, as a step towards international socialism. The aim of revolutionary marxists in the UK must be to build a party capable of winning the working class to that perspective for socialism. Three important tasks must be carried out.
Building a withdrawal movement
A mass rank and file withdrawal movement must be built as a united front of marxists, socialists, radicals, trade unionists, progressive democrats and nationalists etc. Unity should be built on the basis of the demand for British withdrawal and self determination for the Irish people as a whole. We therefore welcome the launch of the Time To Go charter this year as a step in the right direction. We must ensure that the campaign allows democratic participation.
Building a Solidarity movement
All those who support victory for the Irish liberation movement, for troops out now, self determination and release of all political prisoners, must also organise and unite into a movement. A solidarity movement has a vital role to play as an independent left wing of any broad based withdrawal movement, not only in fighting for its own demands but ensuring that a withdrawal movement does not drift to far to the right.
Generalising the republican struggle
It is a historic task for the working class to break up the Unionist state, not only for a united Ireland, but to replace the UK with a Federal Republic of England, Scotland and Wales. Mass support for this demand would greatly assist the struggle in Ireland.
IRELAND AND THE SWP
The Irish question is a litmus test for revolutionary marxists in the UK, and especially the SWP one of the largest marxist organisations. But the politics of the party is not based on any worked out marxist programme. And its strategy is dominated by economism and has more in common with syndicalism. Consequently the Party's Irish work has been determined more by the upturns and downturns of the economic struggle. In practice over twenty years of the Irish struggle has resulted in opportunism and sectarianism.
Instead of leading the fight for the interests of the working class on the Irish issue, the SWP has been more interested in campaigns that merely gain quick recruits. This has not gone unnoticed. It has meant that many SWP comrades feel defensive on the issue of Ireland. At the 1988 party conference, the Central Committee moved to counter criticism, stating that:
"That we alone today on the British left can claim to have passed each decisive test. Our record is second to none, it is qualitatively different. Comrades should reject any tendency towards defensiveness over the Irish issue".
Covering oneself with self congratulations and trumpet blowing fools nobody but the most ignorant, and brings hoots of derision from the rest of us.
Let us examine the record of the Party
In 1968-69 the movement for reforms in the six counties led to a revolutionary upsurge. This resulted in the introduction of the British Army in August 1969 to maintain the Unionist State. The then IS(SWP) dithered in this situation. In Socialist Worker readers were told that "though the troops were not angels they do not have the same ingrained hatred as the RUC and specials, they will not behave with the same viciousness". The leadership voted 9-3 against adopting the slogan of "Troops OUt". Cliff argued that "we must emphasise working class action in the south, whilst recognising that the catholics in the north wanted British troops to remain". It was Duncan Hallas, in a minority, who argued "you couldn't support working class action in the south and accept troops in the north since the role of the troops is to protect partition". It wasn't until nearly a year later Troops Out was called for, Cliff and Harman said they had been right all along!
In the 1970's the Party had an interventionist policy through the Irish sub committee and involved itself in TOM and other campaigns. Even then this work was peripheral and involved only a small number of comrades. Irish work was ghettoised into the sub-committee. This was a political not an organisational problem.
The political problem was perhaps best summed by the statement from Chris Harman, when he said " Ireland was not a radicalising factor in the British working class". Even if we accepted this were true, the fact is that "radicalising" potential requires an active party and movement to challenge such backward ideas. There is no necessity for the tailist "do nothing" conclusion drawn by cmrde Harman. Could you imagine Marx, Connolly or Maclean drawing such a conclusion? No, the political problem was Chris Harman not the British working class.
The "solution" of closing down the Irish sub-committee far from generalising real work, merely got rid of the critics. Rank and file SWP members were well aware of the situation as the Internal Bulletin shows. There was criticism of the "laissez faire attitude, with no fight by the leadership to ensure work was done...there was a total lack of work around the demand for political\POW status for republican prisoners." (IB 1977) As was pointed out the attitude of the CC was "Irish work is OK, if we have time, but really is a distraction from "serious" political work eg steel strike and trade union work". Few comrades were involved in Irish work it was noted not because they weren't interested but because they were never given the opportunity.(IB June 1980)
In 1981 the Hunger strikes drew a mass movement around them. In the Internal Bulletin the Party was attacked for its record: "At no point was there any central direction of whatever work was done. There was no national speakers tour, no coverage of any significance in "Socialist Review" or the rank and file papers, no organised intervention at TU and TUC conferences. Local work was remarkably patchy and totally dependent on individual members responses...And while Socialist Worker did cover the hunger strikes, coverage was hardly regular and massive". (IB 1981)
That was the high point. After which, between 1981-8, Irish work suffered from the SWP's downturnitis. With the political struggle being subordinate to the economic, the onset of the downturn and the decrease in the number of strikes put Irish work out the window. So nothing much to report for seven years until the new mood.
The New Mood and Old Policy
In the present period there is an increase in industrial struggle. The Central Committee realising the adverse effects of its sectarian policies during the downturn has discovered a "new mood". Now it seems that "at times some branches have been hesitant to act believing Ireland is too unpopular". They blame the membership. But the branches haven't forgotten what Chris Harman said!
In the twentieth anniversary year the party is once again intervening in Irish work. The fact that branches are building the Time To GO campaign is to be welcomed. But its worth noting that this has only come about because of united front work done and links made over the last few years when the SWP was absent from the scene. This was why TTG was initiated from within the Labour Party by the Labour Committee on Ireland. The Central Committee said it was "moralism" to think the SWP could act as a vanguard in building a movement.
Recently the leadership has the audacity to say that in the past twenty years "much of the left has flip flopped" on Ireland. As champion flip floppers they ought to know!
Populism or revolution
Chris Bambery in his " Ireland's Permanent Revolution" correctly points out that "The ruling class in Britain and Ireland cannot simply dismantle the Northern State" that is it must be smashed by revolutionary force. But the SWP has no roots in the Irish struggle, so that the biggest danger from TTG is being pulled to the Right. Paul Foot, a leading member, puts forward the case for withdrawal which has more in common with bourgeois liberalism than Marxism. Ken Livingstone stands above him now! In this latest book cmrde Foot sees the solution in terms of Britain "should at once convene a constitutional conference at international level to determine how best withdrawal can be accomplished". (Has the SWP got a new programmatic demand?) What of the struggle of the anti-Unionist masses? "The cause of IRA terrorism" and "terrorism has increased".
Nowhere does he challenge British chauvinism's view that the IRA are terrorists, why workers in the UK should distinguish between the nationalism of the oppressed Irish. Nowhere does he see a role for the working class until after partition. Neither does he see the solution to the national question coming from the working class. And who will determine withdrawal and the future of Ireland? The UK ruling class and a Constitutional conference of international capital. Ann Rogers endorses this book in the Socialist Worker Review as "by far the best".
Economism summed up
For the largest Marxist organisation in the UK the struggle in the six counties should be a central part of its work. But this is not the case. The dominance of economism in the party's politics means that strikes and trade union struggles are prioritised and everything else becomes subordinate to what is seen as the highest expression of working class "self-activity". The party lacks minimum programme to adequately face up to the Irish struggle for what it is - a revolutionary movement in United Kingdom held in check by the state. As a result the SWP is blind to the revolutionary potential within that struggle. Whilst the Party recognises an impasse it solution does not go beyond abstract talk of socialism and workers unity. Consequently the SWP has failed to carry out its responsibilities.
Building for withdrawal
It is a major task for marxists to build a withdrawal movement in the UK. The record of the SWP in the 1980's is poor. Nothing has been done until belatedly getting involved in Time To Go. It is yet to be proven whether the SWP can relate to this not only without sectarianism, but without drifting into right wing opportunism.
Building solidarity
The work of a revolutionary Marxist Party in the UK entails more than building a movement for withdrawal. It must take up a correct position in relation to that united front. It must therefore take the lead in building a movement in solidarity with the Irish people against our own ruling class. The SWP must fight not only for Troops Out Now and Self Determination, but it must support victory to the Irish liberation movement, including their right to wage an armed struggle against military targets in the UK. The fact is it is impossible to build a revolutionary party without serious solidarity work. The SWP does no work in this area. There are campaigns for South African and Polish prisoners what campaigns are there for Irish ones? Is money raised for the prisoners families? Is support built for the Republican movement? The SWP must move beyond the broad politics of a withdrawal movement to a marxist policy of building solidarity however recent indications show that if anything a retreat on the present policies are being endorsed.
Generalising the republican struggle
Being indifferent to politics, except Labourist politics, the SWP is not strongly republican. It does not make connection between the struggle for a United Ireland as part of the fight for a Federal Republic of England Scotland and Wales, and vice versa. Because of the syndicalist aspect, they do not see the advent of a Republic increasing the potentialities of the fight for workers power. Might as well stick with the Constitutional Monarchy!
THE RDG - ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK
Many comrades may be surprised to hear that at the beginning of July, the Revolutionary Democratic Group (RDG) split in two. This is hardly a novel event on the British left in the 1980's. The importance of any split lies in drawing the correct political lessons. Even the smallest local strike can contain within it lessons and experience which has far wider implications.
How to build the SWP
To understand the failure of the RDG we must begin with the central problem the group sought to address - "how to build the SWP into a revolutionary marxist workers party?" Apart from SWP members themselves, the RDG was the only group of marxists to give serious thought to this matter.
The answer we gave was not new. It was based on the experience of Bolshevism which showed that a party can only be built by a long hard and persistent struggle against all forms of opportunism and sectarianism.
Fighting opportunism
In the 1980's the downturn and defeats suffered by workers had served to strengthen the opportunist tendency and greatly weaken the revolutionary forces not only in the movement but especially in the SWP. Without organising the revolutionary left wing, that is without building a militant faction, it will not be possible to win the SWP to a revolutionary line. Only by fighting opportunism in the party will it be possible to fight opportunism in the wider class movement.
SWP left in retreat
The decade of the 1980's shows what progress the SWP left has made. In 1980 the Republican Faction was set up in response to the growing political crisis in the UK and the failure of the SWP to develop a republican strategy. With the retreat of the working class and democratic movement under the impact of Thatcher's downturn, the SWP adopted ultra left tactics. The Bolsheviks used the word "Otzovist" for those tactics. This means leaving the workers movement to sit out the downturn in splendid isolation. In carrying out this shift an inner party struggle took place. The opposition was led by Central Committee member Steve Jefferys. The opposition was defeated in a growing climate of fear and purge. For example the Bradford branch was expelled and comrades in London and Oxford were suspended. Other comrades, leading activists, were expelled or resigned. The party lost most of the small but significant influence it had built up in the unions.
The fight back begins
The RDG was formed in 1983-4 out of ex-SWP comrades. The Group carried on its work as a Marxist Circle. It developed a draft programme, a new theory of permanent revolution, a view of the need to utilise the united front tactic and on the nature of democratic centralism. In 1987 a new set of circumstances developed in the party as a result of unity overtures to Militant and the rest of the left. The RDG took up the unity appeal only for it to be confirmed that the appeal was an opportunist manoeuvre. Our response was to become an external faction of the party.
Building a faction
There is more to building a faction than merely declaring its existence. It places great pressure on a small number of comrades to substitute themselves for the lack of organisation and cadre. Since we were the first ever permanent external faction of the SWP we did not have a great deal of experience to help us. The real struggle was to overcome the situation of anarchy and disorganisation both in terms of ideology and practice. A number of minor disagreements began to show the problems of organisation were not being properly identified and much less overcome.
Membership dispute
In early 1989 a disagreement arose over recruitment methods. The RDG had rejected the "open recruitment" or "self recruitment" practised by the SWP. We saw this as opportunist because it meant recruitment was more important than politics. Our own dispute showed that we had not entirely rid ourselves of the "recruitment above politics" approach. But in a small group, of course, the danger from this is magnified and could therefore undermine the faction.
Anarchism and centralism
Sound recruitment procedures would have minimised this danger. Formally there was agreement as to how recruitment should be carried out. In fact there were different interpretations, shades of emphasis, which on the face of it were insignificant.
Some comrades took a more centralist line. They believed that a candidate should not become a member unless there was majority support by central bodies (i.e. the OC and Aggregate) In fact the constitution gave authority only to the aggregate. This process could only be speeded up provided that there was clear agreement of all members i.e. no objections. Other comrades placed emphasis the other way round. Someone could join without central decision provided there were no valid objections. Here the onus was placed on the individual member to prove a valid objection. This meant that the focus of the decision was moved from a democratic vote in a central body to the individual objector. This was a concession to anarchism and recipe for confusion.
Dispute resolved?
Even small differences can, if insisted upon, lead to a split. The classic example of this was in 1903, when the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party split over what was, at first sight, a slight difference over Paragraph 1 of the Rules. In our particular case the division of opinion very nearly became a split. But we managed to avoid this by a compromise.( With hindsight this proved to be merely a delay) What we learnt in the course of this was that there was an underlying problem of opportunism (i.e. lack of principle) in organisational matters. This fact was soon to become crystal clear.
Bolsheviks and Centralists
Our differences of opinion did not end with the membership dispute. They began to generalise. Between March and June 1989 two positions began to emerge, the "Bolsheviks" and "Centralists". The "Bolsheviks" failed to identify the priorities for building a faction. Politically they were moving away from the party. Furthermore they failed to identify correctly the problem of anarchism. They saw the answer to anarchism in bureaucratic rule mongering instead of marxist principle.
Consequently they rejected both democratic centralism and centralism. This was shown by their proposals for a bureaucratic constitution. The final act of the "Bolsheviks" was to adopt what Trotsky once called the stalinist method of "bureaucratic ultimatumism" (recant! think this....or be expelled)
Centralists were a pro-SWP tendency arguing that the faction could only be built on the basis of a better understanding of the political tasks. We began to argue that we should prioritize our work more carefully and rebuild the faction on the basis of the principle of centralism.
Bolshevik Coup
These divisions were by no means clear cut nor incapable of debate, clarification and resolution inside a single organisation. Such a possibility ended abruptly. The "Bolsheviks" organised a coup or takeover at the July aggregate, which had been called to debate our differences. An agenda had been agreed. But the "Bolsheviks" had a majority of one. They arrived at the start of the meeting with a new agenda and overturned the agreed agenda. The first item on the new agenda was a motion demanding that a Centralist comrade withdraw a statement he had made or be suspended. The motion was carried, all the Bolsheviks voting for and all the Centralists voting against.
RDG splits into RDG(Bolsheviks) and RDG(Centralists)
In our opinion a split was not inevitable until the "Bolsheviks" decided to use their majority for suspensions and expulsions. The centralists had neither seen the agenda or motion before the start of the meeting. The "suspension" was in any case unconstitutional. There was no constitutional procedure for such a move. All the centralists left the aggregate in protest. The "Bolsheviks" then passed their own constitution for the group, to set the seal on their takeover. The debate on the central issue of how to build the faction never took place.
Summing up
The RDG represented a small step forward for the revolutionary wing of the SWP. The split is undoubtedly two steps back. It has separated an anti-SWP bureaucratic tendency from a pro-SWP centralist tendency. The split is an unpleasant fact, but one we do not wish to hide from our comrades.
We must draw definite political conclusions. In 1905 the Russian SDLP attempted to organise uprising against the Tsar. They failed. The Menshevik wing concluded that they should learn to be less insurrectionary in future. The Bolsheviks concluded that next time they should be more insurrectionary.
When the RDG became a faction it was in effect calling for an "insurrection" against the opportunism of Central Committee. The split means that we failed. We must therefore draw the parallel conclusion to that made by Lenin. Far from being demoralised and giving up, we must take into account what we have learnt from our first attempt, and then redouble our efforts and become more organised.
The faction is dead, long live the faction
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